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Abstract
According to standard theory, wealth should have no intrinsic value. Yet, conventional wisdom, recent
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Introduction
Does wealth have intrinsic value to investors? According to standard theory, it shouldn’t. Wealth is a mere
instrument with which current and future consumer goods are acquired. Utility is defined over these goods
only, not over the means through which they are obtained.1 In this light, wealth can only have an indirect
effect on portfolio decisions. Given current endowment, consumption paths are chosen optimally; portfolios
are a mean to support this optimal path. All the main determinants of asset holdings, including risk aversion
or time substitutability, depend on wealth only through its indirect impact on consumption.
Yet, conventional wisdom suggests that net worth might carry additional virtues (see Smith, 1759; Veblen,
1899, for early discussions). Wealth – particularly tangible wealth – encompasses undeniable conspicuous
consumption characteristics. People do enjoy nice cars, houses, furniture and jewelry in part for the services
they yield, but also for the social status that is attached to their ownership (Robson, 1992; Bakshi and Chen,
1996, refer to this as a “capitalistic spirit”). Alternative theories contend that if (i) non-marketed goods are
valuable, (ii) status is a ranking mechanism that determines the allocation of these goods, and (iii) wealth
is a metric that determines status, then wealth-dependent utility can be thought of as resulting from these
effects. Examples of such non-marketed goods include country club memberships, or invitations to charity
events, or even the quality of potential partners in matching games (Cole et al., 1992, 1995; Corneo and
Jeanne, 1999).
From a theoretical perspective, direct preference for wealth is an element of state-contingent preferences.
These preferences imply that the state – in this case wealth – directly affects risk aversion and time substi-
tutability, in addition to its indirect effect discussed earlier. In static terms, this should reinforce the links
between wealth and tolerance to risk and/or time substitutability; cross-sectional evidence on portfolios is
consistent with this conjecture. For example, it is well known that participation in risky asset markets is
mainly limited to a relatively small share of individuals (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Haliassos and Bertaut,
1995; Guvenen, 2003b) who appear to have different preferences compared to the average agent. Empirical
evidence is consistent with stockholders (i) being wealthier (Poterba, 2000; Aı¨t-Sahalia et al., 2004; Reynard,
2004), and having (ii) a larger elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002; Guvenen,
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2003b) and (iii) a lower degree of risk aversion (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Attanasio et al., 2002; Brav et al.,
2002).2
From a dynamic perspective, state-contingent preferences imply that portfolios will contain dynamic
hedging strategies against unfavorable shifts in that state. These strategic portfolios are qualitatively similar
to those obtained under time-varying investment sets, and result in time-varying portfolio shares (Cox et al.,
1985; Merton, 1990; Lo and Wang, 2001). This time variation in portfolio is a salient feature of the data.
Figure 1 plots the aggregate portfolio shares of financial wealth (i.e. cash + stocks + bonds) invested in cash,
bonds and stocks for American households and non-profit organizations.3 To highlight cyclical properties,
we also plot the NBER Experimental Recession Index (XRI), a counter-cyclical indicator (right hand side
axis). Two observations immediately stand out: (i) portfolio shares of financial wealth are not constant,
and (ii) they exhibit strong cyclical patterns. In particular, cash and bonds are counter-cyclical, whereas
corporate stocks are pro-cyclical.4 The formers increase, whereas the latter decreases when there is a high
likelihood of recession.
[ Insert Figure 1 here ]
An intuitively-appealing interpretation is that risk aversion is higher during downturns and that agents
react by shifting assets away from risky stocks. This counter-cyclical risk aversion conjecture is confirmed by
the pricing literature showing that conditional excess returns on corporate equity are also counter-cyclical:
high during recessions and falling during recoveries (Cochrane, 1997; Guvenen, 2003a). From a C-CAPM
perspective, because the quantities of consumption risk display poor cyclicality, this implies that the price
of that risk is counter-cyclical (Campbell and Cochrane, 1999b; Gordon and St-Amour, 2000, 2004; Melino
and Yiang, 2003). Consequently risk aversion is increasing in recessions and decreasing in recoveries.
In our setup, the main element behind these shifts in risk aversion would have to be wealth. Direct
impacts of wealth on risk aversion would augment indirect impacts obtained through consumption. Again,
this interpretation fits apparently well with the data; compared to consumption, movements in wealth hold
more promise in generating corresponding movements in risk aversion. To see this, consider (de-trended)
consumption, and financial wealth and (untransformed) consumption shares of wealth plotted in Figure 2,
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again with the XRI index.5 The data suggests that (i) wealth is strongly pro-cyclical whereas (ii) consumption
has comparatively negligible cyclical component, such that (iii) the consumption share of wealth is strongly
counter-cyclical. A high likelihood of a recession is associated with marked declines in wealth, and almost no
reduction in consumption, pointing out to considerable smoothing of consumption by agents. Unsurprisingly,
the consumption share increases during downturns.
[ Insert Figure 2 here ]
Based on these observations, our objectives are (i) to develop a model of direct preferences for wealth,
(ii) characterize its implications for risk aversion, optimal portfolio and consumption and (iii) to test these
predictions using the aggregate portfolio, wealth and consumption data just presented. Finally, although
the main emphasis of this paper is in goods space, we (iv) discuss the pricing implications of the model in
terms of addressing the main anomalies of the C-CAPM.
In the spirit of the habit literature we focus on time-varying minimum admissible consumption, or
(marginal utility) bliss level (Sundaresan, 1989; Constantinides, 1990; Ferson and Constantinides, 1991;
Campbell and Cochrane, 1999a). However, contrary to standard habit models, we let bliss be determined
by wealth, rather than by lagged consumption. As Munro and Sugden (2003) argue, habit models capture
reference-dependent preferences. Past decisions determine the value of a reference point, and deviations
about this point determine utility. The reference can be a function of past consumption (as is the case
under habit), or endowment (as is the case in this paper). Munro and Sugden (2003, p. 420) contend
that the second case is more appropriate in a dynamic framework, and in particular, when buying assets.
Wealth-induced movements in bliss are important to the extent that they result in rotations (rather than
shifts) in the marginal utility schedule.6 These rotations affect both marginal utility of consumption and
consumption risk aversion. In comparison, multiplicatively separable models of direct preferences for wealth
(Bakshi and Chen, 1996; Futagami and Shibata, 1998; Gong and Zou, 2002) may only affect the former;
additively separable models (Corneo and Jeanne, 2001; Kuznitz and Kandel, 2003; Aı¨t-Sahalia et al., 2004)
affect neither.
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One possibility is that higher wealth increases what is considered as basic minimum by the agent. In
this case, given consumption, a wealthier agent is closer to bliss, has higher marginal utility and is more
risk averse. We will refer to this case as a ratchet investor. A second possibility is that bliss falls in wealth.
In this case, any given consumption is further away from basic minimum as wealth increases. A wealthier
agent both gains less marginal satisfaction from a given consumption and is less reluctant to take risk. We
will refer to this case as a blase´ investor.
In the absence of strong priors as to which of the two effects is dominant, we take the model to the data.
Standard preference-based approaches to asset markets typically characterize and test the models’ asset
pricing implications. We depart from these by imposing the full theoretical restrictions from the optimal
allocations on a continuous-time econometric model and testing that model over the aggregate household
portfolio data plotted in Figures 1–2 instead. Specifically, we characterize the closed-form solutions for
optimal consumption, and portfolio in a continuous-time setting. Substituting these rules in the budget
constraint yields a multivariate Brownian motion in consumption, asset holdings and wealth. This fully
structural econometric model presents estimation challenges as both drifts, diffusions, as well as off-diagonal
scedastic elements are (i) constrained by the model and (ii) depending on the state. Fortunately, we show
how a suitable identification strategy tackles the first problem while a change of variables addresses the
second one.
Our earlier discussion suggests that the blase´ investor case is more likely given that wealthier agents are
less risk averse, that wealth was quite pro-cyclical, and that risk aversion was possibly counter-cyclical. Our
empirical findings confirm this intuition. We find that wealth has significantly positive independent value to
investors. A consequence is that bliss falls in wealth, as does risk aversion. Moreover, the null hypotheses
of alternative preference models, such as iso-elastic (CRRA) or hyperbolic (HARA) preferences are rejected
when tested against our wealth-dependent utility alternative.
Because wealth was found to be more volatile and cyclical than consumption, this entails a larger volatility
and cyclicality of the marginal utility. From a pricing perspective, this additional co-movement is a welcomed
addition to the smooth consumption series in a C-CAPM pricing kernel. We show that the premia entails a
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second source of risk (in addition to consumption risk), that this risk is the market (a result also found for non-
expected utility models, e.g. Duffie and Epstein, 1992), and that its price has the intuitive interpretation of
being risk aversion with respect to wealth. As market risk is quantitatively more important than consumption
risk, a large observed premia can be justified by direct preference over wealth. Our model has therefore a
potential to successfully address the equity premium puzzle. Moreover, movements in risk aversion just
described are useful to address the predictability puzzle concerning the time variation in conditional excess
returns. Even if consumption and wealth covariances are conditionally homoscedastic, counter-cyclical risk
aversion will result in counter-cyclical premia. Finally, the large volatility of marginal utility warrants a
larger precautionary demand for the risk-free asset, thereby justifying the low risk-free rate.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We outline the model, and the closed-form solutions in
Section 1. Next, we introduce the empirical methods in Section 2, and present the estimation results in
Section 3. We discuss the pricing implications of these results in Section 4, before concluding.
1 Model
This section outlines the model. We subsequently characterize optimal consumption and asset holdings.
Finally, we obtain the closed-form expressions for the differential equations governing consumption, asset
values and wealth.
A Economic environment and preferences
In order to emphasize the role of our alternative preference specification, we consider a complete-markets and
representative-agent framework similar that studied by Merton (1971) or by Lucas (1978). The stochastic
environment is characterized by continuous information with filtration on Zt ∈ R
n, a standard Brownian
motion. The investment set consists of n risky securities and one risk-less asset. Denote by µp,t ∈ R
n and
by σp,t ∈ R
n×n the adapted drift and diffusion processes for the risky returns, and by rt ∈ R the short rate
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process. We start by imposing a constant set restriction, i.e. µp,t = µp,σi,t = σi, and, rt = r,∀i, t. This
assumption is relaxed later when we discuss pricing implications.
The representative agent’s objective is to select consumption Ct and portfolio weights vt ∈ R
n so as to
maximize VNM utility characterized by direct preference over wealth Wt:
max
{Ct,vt}t
E0
∫ ∞
0
exp(−ρt)U(Ct,Wt)dt, (1)
subject to
dWt = {[v
′
t(µp − r) + r]Wt − Ct}dt+Wtv
′
tσpdZt, (2)
where E0 is a conditional expectations operator, and ρ > 0 is a subjective discount rate. The agent’s
within-period utility is given by:
U(C,W ) =


(ηcC+η0+ηwW )
1−γ
1−γ , ifγ 6= 1;
log(ηcC + η0 + ηwW ), ifγ = 1.
(3)
Utility (3) belongs to the HARA class advocated by Rubinstein (1974), modified to allow for wealth
dependence. Following Merton (1990, p. 137), the necessary HARA restrictions are:
ηc > 0, ηcC + η0 + ηwW > 0, γ ≥ 0. (4)
These are required to guarantee monotonicity and concavity. To these, we add a further theoretical restriction
that bounds below and above the term ηw:
−1 < ηw/ηc < ρ. (5)
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This condition allows for negative or positive values of the loading of wealth in the utility function, ηw, but
limits the size of the effect.7
Subject to restrictions (4) and (5), the utility function (3) has interesting properties. The expression
Cbliss,t ≡ −(η0 + ηwWt)/ηc has the interpretation of a fictitious reference, or bliss level of consumption,
where bliss is defined with respect to marginal, as opposed to the level of, utility.8 More precisely, as
consumption falls toward bliss, marginal utility goes to infinity, such that Cbliss,t is the minimum admissible
consumption level. In addition, under WDU, the bliss level changes because of changes in wealth. In contrast,
slow-moving habit or durability models let the reference level be a function of past consumption, whether
individual, or aggregate. Finally, CRRA utility and HARA utility fix the bliss consumption to 0 and −η0/ηc
respectively, both state-independent levels.
The marginal utility, and the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (calculated with respect
to consumption and wealth) are respectively:
Ux =
ηx
(ηcC + η0 + ηwW )
γ , (6)
Rax ≡
−Uxx
Ux
=
γηx
(ηcC + η0 + ηwW )
, x = c, w. (7)
To understand the direct impact of wealth on these variables, consider the effect on marginal utility of
consumption following an increase in W . As shown in Figure 3, when ηw < 0, as wealth increases, so
does the minimum level of consumption from −ηwW0, to −ηwW1. Hence, a negative wealth dependence
involves a ratchet effect whereby the bliss consumption level increases in wealth. This leads to a clockwise
rotation in the marginal utility schedule from Uc,0 to Uc,1, and increases marginal utility from a to b. Put
differently, as wealth increases, the agent approaches his reference consumption, and becomes more averse
toward consumption risk.
[ Insert Figure 3 here ]
Next, these movements in marginal utility and risk aversion are reversed for ηw > 0, as shown in Figure 4.
An increase in wealth now reduces minimum admissible consumption from −ηwW0, to −ηwW1. This causes a
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counter-clockwise rotation in the marginal utility schedule from Uc,0 to Uc,1, and a reduction in the marginal
utility of consuming the same level of nondurable good falls from a to b. This effect could be related to
blase´ behavior; as the investor becomes richer, for a given level of consumption, both marginal utility and
consumption risk aversion fall.
[ Insert Figure 4 here ]
The utility function (3) can also be thought of as a linear habit model where the habit stock is defined
to be a function of current wealth:
Wt =
1
πt
Et
∫ ∞
t
πsCsds, (8)
where πt is a state-price density. In this perspective, instantaneous utility is not only a function of current
consumption, but also of the future consumption paths that current wealth could support (see Kuznitz and
Kandel, 2003, for a discussion). These paths determine the benchmark through which current consumption
scenarios are evaluated.9 As is shown next, this habit stock interpretation of (3) considerably simplifies the
solution to the agent’s problem.
B Optimal Consumption and Portfolio Rules
The agent’s problem (1) could be solved using standard dynamic programming methods. It turns out however
that a simpler alternative is available. We mentioned earlier that the preferences (3) belong to the linear
habit class where the habit stock is defined to be current wealth. Schroder and Skiadas (2002) show that
closed-form expressions for linear habit models (the primal problem) are conveniently obtained by simple
modifications to the standard solutions in models without habit (the dual problem). Their analysis is cast
in terms of consumption-based habit, but it can be readily extended to our wealth-based habit setup. First,
by appropriately redefining the state-price density, expressions for the dual short rate and dual risk premia
can be obtained. Second, these expressions are then substituted back into the known solutions to the dual
problem. Third, the solutions to the primal problem are obtained by adding in the wealth-in-the-utility term
to the second-step solutions.
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In what follows let Xt refer to a variable in the primal problem and let Xˆt refer to its dual problem
counterpart. We start by defining the dual variables as follows:
Cˆt ≡ Ct + ηw/ηcWt, (9)
Uˆ(Cˆt) ≡
(Cˆt + η0/ηc)
1−γ
1− γ
= U(Ct,Wt), (10)
where U(Ct,Wt) is as in (3), since expected utility is defined only up to an affine transformation. Next,
replace for Ct in budget constraint (2) by using (9) to obtain:
dWt = {[v
′
t(µp − r) + r]Wt − Cˆt + ηw/ηcWt}dt+Wtv
′
tσpdZt,
= {[v′t(µp − r) + (r + ηw/ηc)]Wt − Cˆt}dt+Wtv
′
tσpdZt,
= {[v′t(µp − r) + rˆ]Wt − Cˆt}dt+Wtv
′
tσpdZt, (11)
where rˆ ≡ r + ηw/ηc. Observe that wealth, portfolio, and the risk premia (µp − r) remain unchanged.
Second, let πt be the (primal) state-price density. The previous analysis suggests that its dual analog
must satisfy:
πˆt ≡ e
−(ηw/ηc)tπt, (12)
from which,
dπˆt/πˆt = −(ηw/ηc)dt+ dπt/πt. (13)
To see that (12) is the appropriate dual state price density, note that a standard no-arbitrage argument
establishes that the risk-free rate and risk premia process for the state-price density πˆt in the dual market
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must satisfy:
rˆ = −µpˆi/πˆt (14)
= (ηw/ηc) + r (15)
µpˆ − rˆ = − (1/πˆt)σpσ
′
pˆi
(16)
= µp − r, (17)
as was required under (11).
Hence, the (exogenous) short rate process used by the agent in the dual problem is simply the short rate
process in the primal problem plus the wealth dependency parameter; the risk premium process used by the
agent is the same in both the dual and the primal problem. Under the iso-morphism result of Schroder and
Skiadas (2002), we can:
1. use the known solutions of Merton for the dual problem (Cˆt, vˆt) as functions of Wt, rˆ,µp − r,
2. correct the short rate in these solutions using (15),
3. get back the expression for Ct by inverting (9); the expression for vt is the same as that for vˆt.
Following this iso-morphism approach reveals that the indirect utility J(Wt), the optimal consumption Ct
and the value of risky assets V t ≡ vtWt are respectively given by:
J(Wt) =
(G+ FWt)
1−γ
1− γ
, (18)
Ct =
η0
ηc
{(
γ − 1
γ
)(
ρ/(γ − 1) + 0.5Q/γ
r + ηw/ηc
)
−
1
γ
}
+
{(
γ − 1
γ
)
(r + ρ/(γ − 1) + 0.5Q/γ)−
ηw
ηcγ
}
Wt, (19)
Vt =
(
η0/ηc
r + ηw/ηc
)
Σ−1pp (µp − r)
γ
+
Σ−1pp (µp − r)
γ
Wt, (20)
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where,
F ≡ ηc
{(
γ − 1
γ
)(
r +
ηw
ηc
+
ρ
γ − 1
+ 0.5Q/γ
)}γ/(γ−1)
,
G ≡
η0
ηc
{(
γ
γ − 1
)
1
ηc
(
F
ηc
)−1/γ
−
ρ
F (γ − 1)
−
0.5Q
γF
}−1
,
Q ≡ (µp − r)
′Σ−1pp (µp − r) ≥ 0,
Σij ≡ E[σidZtdZ
′
tσ
′
j ]
It can be shown that these solutions correspond exactly to those obtained using the more traditional dynamic
programming approach.
Equation (18) highlights interesting characteristics of the value function. First, we find that J(Wt) is
iso-morphic to the instantaneous utility function U(Ct,Wt) in (3). The particular form of wealth dependence
that we are considering supposes that the Bernoulli transform is applied to an affine function of wealth. This
functional has the property that the value function is also in the HARA class. Note in particular that η0 = 0
implies G = 0, such that the value function becomes iso-elastic despite the wealth dependence.
Second, following our previous discussion, we can analyze risk aversion using the marginal utility of
wealth schedule, Jw,t, and the distance of an arbitrary wealth level Wt from minimum admissible bliss level.
In particular, straightforward manipulations reveal that:
Wbliss ≡
−G
F
=
−η0
ηcr + ηw
, (21)
−WtJww,t
Jw,t
=
γWt
Wt −Wbliss
. (22)
The constant bliss level of wealth (21) can take on negative or positive values depending on the parameters
ηi, i = 0, c, w and on the interest rate r. In particular, since ηc, r > 0, ηw < 0 pushes the bliss level away
from zero, ηw > 0 pushes it toward zero. For Wbliss < 0, a positive ηw (blase´) moves the bliss asymptote
to the right (see Figure 5). Given any wealth level, the agent is closer to bliss, and therefore characterized
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by a higher degree of absolute risk aversion. A negative ηw (ratchet) decreases absolute risk aversion for the
opposite reason. When Wbliss > 0, movements in bliss are reversed, and we find that a blase´ investor has
lower absolute risk aversion than a ratchet investor. With respect to relative risk aversion (22), a (negative)
positive bliss implies that risk aversion is (pro-) counter-cyclical.
[ Insert Figure 5 here ]
Next, the optimal rules (19) and (20) are affine in wealth. As for the standard HARA utility, imposing
η0 = 0 results in the iso-elastic case of both rules being proportional to net worth. Otherwise, wealth
dependence affects both the intercept (Ct,V t) and the slope (Ct) of the closed-form solutions. To isolate
these effects, it is useful to resort to our previous analysis of the value function. Note that we can indeed
rewrite the optimal rules as:
Ct = −
{(
γ − 1
γ
)
Wbliss [ρ/(γ − 1) + 0.5Q/γ] +
η0
γηc
}
+
{(
γ − 1
γ
)
[r + ρ/(γ − 1) + 0.5Q/γ]−
ηw
γηc
}
Wt, (23)
(µp − r)
′V t =
Q
γ
{−Wbliss +Wt}, (24)
where Wbliss is given by (21). For the rest of this section’s analysis, assume that the investor is at least
moderately risk averse, i.e γ > 1.
First, turning to consumption, we obtain the intuitive result that for positive Wbliss, minimum consump-
tion, i.e the intercept in (23), is negative (or less positive), and positive (or less negative) otherwise. Ceteris
paribus, Wbliss > 0 implies a steeper marginal utility of wealth at the optimum, and consequently, greater
Jw risk. The risk-averse investor reacts to this by increasing wealth away from bliss. This is achieved by
decreasing consumption and increasing savings. Secondly, regardless of Wbliss, a blase´ investor always has a
lower marginal propensity to consume out of wealth than a ratchet investor. This result is again intuitively
appealing. Since a blase´ investor positively values status, he always saves more at the margin.
Third, (24) expresses the expected excess return (in $ terms) on the optimal total wealth portfolio. As
usual, higher curvature γ results in more conservative positions. Again, bliss levels of wealth influence the
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intercept terms. A positive Wbliss implies more MU risk at any wealth levels. The risk-averse agent hedges
away these risks by selecting more conservative portfolios. Negative bliss values however reduce risk aversion
and increase the asset values held in risky assets. Fourth, for reasons discussed earlier, when bliss is negative,
ηw < 0 shifts bliss to the left and decreases risk aversion; the ratchet investor therefore selects a more risky
portfolio, the blase´ a more conservative one. These positions are reversed for Wbliss > 0; the blase´ investor’s
portfolio is more risky compared to the ratchet’s.
Clearly linearity for the optimal rules (19), and (20) implies that the change in consumption and portfolio
are dCt = cwdWt, and dV t = vwdWt, where cw,vw are constants defined by (19) and (20). We can also
substitute the solutions in the budget constraint (2) to obtain the closed-form expression for instantaneous
changes in wealth. Consequently the instantaneous changes in consumption, the value invested in assets,
and wealth are:
dCt =
{(
γ − 1
γ
)
(r + ρ/(γ − 1) + 0.5Q/γ)−
1
γ
ηw
ηc
}
dWt, (25)
dV t =
Σ−1pp (µp − r)
γ
dWt, (26)
dWt =
[
η0/ηc + (r + ηw/ηc)Wt
γ(r + ηw/ηc)
]{[(
γ + 1
γ
)
0.5Q+ r + ηw/ηc − ρ
]
dt
+(µp − r)
′Σ−1pp σpdZt
}
. (27)
2 Estimation
A Econometric Model
Estimation focuses on the multivariate Brownian motion given by (25)–(27), which can be written as:
dCt = cwdWt, (28)
dV t = vwdWt, (29)
dWt = [µ0 + µwWt]dt+ [σ0 + σwWt]dZt, (30)
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where cw,vw, µ0, µw, σ0, σw are constant loadings that depend only on the deep parameters. In principle,
estimation of the model could be undertaken in price space or in quantity space. We select the second
approach for a number of reasons.
First, the quantity space results impose considerably more theoretical restrictions that are related to
the deep parameters on the joint first and second moments. With respect to deep parameters, standard
analyses in price space treat the equilibrium quantities in the pricing kernels as exogenous; the theoretical
restrictions are imposed on the prices of risk exclusively, with conditional second moments left unrestricted. In
comparison, the quantity space analysis produces theoretical restrictions on both first and second moments of
changes in consumption, asset holdings and wealth (through the restrictions on cw,vw, µ0, µw, σ0, σw), while
returns are treated as exogenous. In the absence of prior information on ηw in particular, these additional
restrictions will be useful in identifying the preference parameters of interest. Second, empirical studies of
aggregate optimal consumption and asset holdings are much less frequent than asset pricing studies. We
believe that focusing on quantities rather than on returns thus provides another perspective that complements
existing results (Lo and Wang, 2001, also argue in favor of using the informational content of quantities more
thoroughly).
Transformation One major problem in estimating (28)–(30) is that there exists no closed-form transition
density for multi-variate Brownian motions with affine drifts and diffusions. Indeed, analytical expressions for
the likelihood function exist only for a limited class of Itoˆ processes (Melino, 1996). Unfortunately, our multi-
variate process does not belong to this class. Alternative solutions include discrete (Euler) approximations,
and simulating the continuous-time paths between the discretely-sampled data, either through classical
(Durham and Gallant, 2002) or through Bayesian (Eraker, 2001) approaches.
Our solution to this problem is different and considerably simpler to implement. It is based on a
homoscedasticity-inducing transformation for general Brownian motions. It will be shown that this ap-
proach also stationarizes the drift term. Consequently, a standard discretized approximation is appropriate,
efficient, and unbiased. In particular, a straightforward application of Itoˆ’s lemma reveals the following.
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Lemma 1 Let Xt ∈ {Ct,V t} be defined as follows:
Xt = x0 + xwWt, (31)
dWt = (µ0 + µwWt)dt+ (σ0 + σwWt)dZt, (32)
where x,µ,σ are constants defined in (19) and (20), and in (27), and consider the following transformation:
X˜t =
log[xwσ0 + σw(Xt − x0)]
σw
, (33)
Then, X˜t has constant drift and diffusion given by:
dX˜t =
[
µw
σw
− 0.5σw
]
dt+ dZt. (34)
Proof. First, (31) and (32) reveal that:
dXt = [xwµ0 + µw(Xt − x0)]dt+ [xwσ0 + σw(Xt − x0)]dZt (35)
= µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dZt. (36)
Next, by Itoˆ’s lemma, we have for X˜t = X˜(Xt):
dX˜j,t =
[
µ(Xt)X˜
′(Xt) + 0.5σ(Xt)
2X˜ ′′(Xt)
]
dt+ σ(Xt)X˜
′(Xt)dZt (37)
Observe that µ0/µw = σ0/σw to substitute in (37) to obtain (34).
The transformation (33) requires that its first derivative with respect to the Itoˆ process Xt is the inverse
of the diffusion. It is usually introduced in order to stationarize the diffusion (Shoji and Ozaki, 1998; Aı¨t-
Sahalia, 2002; Durham and Gallant, 2002). In our case, both drift and diffusion are affine and have intercept
and slope coefficients that are closely inter-related. Consequently the theoretical restrictions implied by the
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model are such that the transformation also stationarizes the drift term. This is fortunate since the resulting
transformed model is easily estimated by maximum likelihood. In particular, the discretization of (34):
∆X˜t =
[
µw
σw
− 0.5σw
]
+ ǫt (38)
where ǫt is a standard Gaussian term, can be consistently and efficiently estimated by MLE (e.g. Gourieroux
and Jasiak, 2001, pp. 287–288).
Likelihood function The optimal rules in (19) and (20) take the moments of the returns’ distribution
µp,Σpp, as well as the risk-free rate r as given. These moments could be estimated in an external round,
using a two-step method, and substituted back into the optimal rules to obtain the predicted rules. Instead,
we perform a single-step procedure and incorporate the mean and covariance matrix of the risky returns into
the calculation of the likelihood function.10 This approach has the advantage of factoring in the parametric
uncertainty concerning µp,Σpp into the calculation of the standard errors of the deep parameters. Specifi-
cally, denote by X˜t ≡ [C˜t, V˜ t, W˜t]
′ the n + 2 vector of transformed variables, the model to be estimated is
the following:

 ∆X˜t
∆P t/P t−1

 =

µx
µp

+

ǫx
ǫp

 ,

ǫx
ǫp

 ,∼ N.I.D.



0x
0p

 ,

Ix 0
0 Σpp



 , (39)
where µx is given by (38), and Ix is an n+ 2 identity matrix.
First, in accordance with the maintained assumption of the model, all the innovations are Gaussian.
Second, as mentioned earlier, the transformation in Lemma 1 implies that the quantities innovations are
standardized white noise. Third, consistent with the model, the covariance matrix is block diagonal, i.e.
we impose the absence of cross-correlations between innovations in quantities and returns. Any potential
covariance between the two is fully taken into account in the closed-form solutions; allowing for additional
correlations is not theoretically justified.
16
With these elements in mind, the contributions to the likelihood function (with constant term omitted)
are given by:
ft = −0.5 log[det (Σ)] + log[det(Kt)]− 0.5ǫ
′
tΣ
−1ǫt (40)
where Σ is defined implicitly in (39), while Kt ≡ Diag([Kc,t,Kv,t,Kw,t, 1, . . . 1]) and Kx,t = 1/[xwσ0 +
σw(Xt − x0)] is a Jacobian correction term associated with the transformation (38). The parameter vector
is then θ ≡ {γ, ρ, η0, ηc, ηw,µp,Qpp}, where Qpp ≡ Chol(Σpp) is the n-dimensional triangular Cholesky root
of the returns covariance matrix.
Hypothesis tests It will be recalled that theoretical restrictions for HARA and WDU utility are necessary
to guarantee that marginal utility is non-negative. In particular, for both models, restriction (4) is required
for monotone preferences, whereas for WDU utility, (5) verifies that the agent has a positive effective discount
rate.
We also consider two benchmarks in assessing the performance of the WDU model. As mentioned earlier,
CRRA utility is obtained by imposing that η0, ηw = 0, whereas HARA utility imposes ηw = 0. To the extent
that it has been studied extensively in asset pricing models, CRRA utility constitutes a natural benchmark.
HARA utility, although less popular, has the advantage of optimal rules which are not proportional to
wealth (see the previous discussion). Both the theoretical restrictions and the model selection tests will be
performed and discussed below.
B Data
Our data set consists of post-war U.S. quarterly observations on aggregate consumption, asset holdings and
corresponding returns indices. The time period covered ranges from 1952:II to 2000:IV, for a total of 195
observations. All quantities are expressed in real, per-capita terms, where the aggregate price index is taken
to be the implicit GDP deflator. Similarly, all returns are converted in real terms by subtracting the inflation
index.
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Consumption The consumption series is the aggregate expenditure on Non-Durables and Services. The
source of the data is the Bureau of Economic Analysis NIPA series. This series has been used in most asset
pricing studies.
Assets The aggregate portfolio holdings are defined as follows:
V t = [V0,t, V1,t, V2,t]
= [Deposits, Bonds, Stocks].
Each asset holdings are obtained from the Flow of Funds Accounts made available by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve (Table L.100). They correspond to the level values of asset holdings by households
and non-profit organizations (see also Lettau and Ludvigson, 2003). More precisely the individual assets
(mnemonic) and financial wealth are:
• Deposits (FL15400005): Includes foreign, checkable, time, savings deposits and money market fund
shares.
• Bonds (FL153061005): U.S. government securities (Treasury and Agency).
• Stocks (FL153064105): Corporate equities directly held by households.
• Wealth: Deposits + Bonds + Stocks (Wt = V0,t + V1,t + V2,t).
Deposits will thus be taken to represent the risk-free asset, whereas both long-term government bonds and
corporate equity are proxies for the risky assets.
The choice of specific portfolio holdings was dictated by a number of practical elements. First, these
assets correspond to some of the largest asset holdings for U.S. households, and their returns have been
studied extensively in the asset pricing literature, thus providing useful benchmarks for our analysis. In
particular, we are interested in verifying whether the pricing anomalies associated with cash and stock
returns have dual analogs in the quantity space. Second and related, these assets have corresponding returns
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series. Those returns are required to evaluate the distributional parameters µp,Σpp that are used to compute
the theoretical asset holdings. Other portfolio holdings such as pension and life insurance reserves are also
important in relative size. However, no clear returns indices are available for these assets.11
Our definition of wealth has been used in theoretical models of portfolio choice (e.g. Campbell et al.,
2003). Its main advantage is that wealth is thus observable and the definition provides more structure on the
econometric model since one of the theoretical asset holding is defined residually.12 However, the definition
is narrow in the sense that it abstracts from tangible (real) and human wealth. Unfortunately, real returns
indices on durable goods are difficult to evaluate, and these assets were omitted from our selected holdings
series V t. Moreover, human wealth is not observable, whether in levels or in rates of returns and thus also
eliminated.
Table 1 reports the sample moments for the consumption and asset holdings in percentage of wealth
(those series were plotted in Figures 1–2). A first observation is that the shares of wealth allocated to
consumption, deposits and stocks are roughly of the same order of magnitude, and similarly volatile. Bonds
on the other hand represent a much lower share of wealth and are smoother.
[ Insert Table 1 here ]
Returns We follow Campbell et al. (2003) in constructing the returns series that correspond to our assets
definition. The return on cash is taken to be the real return on 3-months Treasury Bills. The return on bonds
is proxied by the real return on 5-years T-Bills. Finally, stock returns are evaluated as the value-weighted
returns on the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX markets. Bond and stock returns were obtained from the CRSP
data file. Again, the inflation series is computed from the GDP deflator.
Table 2 presents sample moments of the real returns. These series have been widely discussed in the
asset pricing literature, so we only briefly outline their main features. First, we observe that both bonds and
stocks warrant a positive premia. Equity returns however are clearly larger, and much more volatile. Next,
we find that both cash and bonds as well as bonds and stocks are positively, and similarly correlated. Cash
and stocks on the other hand display no covariance.
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[ Insert Table 2 here ]
3 Results
A Estimation details
Identifiability The theoretical model in (25)–(27) presents some important challenges for identification.
Indeed, the parameters are often expressed as ratios of one another which usually results in poor identifiabil-
ity. These problems affect both the HARA and WDU models, but not the CRRA model. As is well known,
utility is defined only up to an affine transformation such that the parameter ηc plays no role in the optimal
rules when η0, ηw = 0. In preliminary estimation rounds, we experimented with numerous identification
strategies which we briefly discuss.
A first approach was to fix the subjective discount rate ρ to a realistic value, and to let ηc be flexible.
We found that both HARA and WDU models were then poorly identifiable; results were highly dependent
on starting values, and convergence problems were noticed. Second, we let ρ be flexible, and fixed ηc.
Whereas HARA utility was well identified and yielded realistic ρ estimates, the WDU model was not. In
particular, we found that we could not identify ρ and ηw separately. Nonetheless, the effective discount
rate ρ− ηw/ηc was uniquely identifiable, and realistic. Finally, we fixed both ρ, ηc, and found this approach
to be the most satisfactory. Both models were then clearly identified, with robustness to starting values
and rapid convergence. We found that the curvature parameter γ was completely independent from the
choice of calibration for ηc. Moreover, changing ηc resulted in changing the estimated η0, ηw in the same
proportions, such that the T-statistics were always unaffected by the calibrated value of ηc. This again
indicates that although the ratios η0/ηc, ηw/ηc are well identified, the separate parameters are not. We
therefore fix ρ = (1 + 0.035)1/4 − 1, a realistic value, and follow the asset pricing literature in arbitrarily
imposing ηc = 1 to estimate γ, η0, ηw. The vector of free parameters is then {γ, η0, ηw,µp,Qpp}.
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B Parameter estimates
Table 3 presents the estimated parameters for model (39). Panel A imposes the CRRA restrictions that
η0 = ηw = 0; Panel B imposes the HARA restriction that ηw = 0. Panel C relaxes these restrictions
altogether for the WDU model.
[ Insert Table 3 here ]
Theoretical restrictions First, regarding the monotonicity restriction, CRRA utility trivially respects
non-negative marginal utility. In the case of HARA and WDU, this condition needs to be verified. We test
that monotonicity is always maintained by evaluating (4) at the minimum consumption and wealth levels:
ηcmin(Ct) + η0 + ηwmin(Wt) > 0
Since ηc ≡ 1 and ηw is estimated positive, this approach is sufficient to guarantee monotonicity throughout
our sample. For HARA utility, the statistic (standard error) is 6,474 (0.35); for WDU, it is 6,6157 (87.95).
We thus conclude that monotonicity condition (4) is verified for both HARA and WDU.
Second, we verify that the effective discount rate for WDU preferences is non-negative as in (5). Since
ηc ≡ 1, this is obtained by testing
H0 : ρ− ηw = 0,
against the alternative of negative discounting. Evaluated at our parameter estimates in Panel C, the effective
discount rate is -0.0099 (0.0121), a negative but low value that is not statistically significant, such that the
null is not rejected. We therefore conclude that all three models satisfy the theoretical restrictions and
proceed with the analysis of the point estimates.
Individual estimates The estimates for the curvature parameter γ in Table 3 are positive, significant
and realistic for all three preference specifications. Indeed, it is widely recognized that this parameter should
be positive, but less than 10 for iso-elastic utility (e.g. Mehra and Prescott, 1985). Moreover, the point
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estimates are lower for WDU. Whether or not this translates into a lower level of risk aversion for these
functionals will be addressed below.
Next, we find that the bliss parameter η0 is negative and very significant for HARA utility, and even more
negative, but less significant under WDU. This implies that the reference consumption level is positive under
HARA preferences. Under WDU, the fictitious bliss level ranges between -100 and -800 and remains negative
throughout. Third, the wealth dependence parameter ηw is positive, and significant, thereby rejecting the
null of HARA utility when tested against the WDU alternative. Our results are therefore consistent with a
statistically significant blase´ behavior with respect to financial wealth. A test of the joint CRRA restrictions
(η0 = ηw = 0) reveals that the null of iso-elastic preferences is strongly rejected when tested against either
HARA or WDU.
C Relative Risk Aversion Estimates
Figure 6 plots the risk aversion estimates for the three utility functions. Panel A plots the consumption risk
aversion, −CtUcc,t/Uc,t, panel B the wealth risk aversion −WtUww,t/Uw,t, and panel C the indirect utility
function risk aversion −WtJww,t/Jw,t. The dotted line corresponds to CRRA utility, the dashed line to
HARA, and the thick, solid line to WDU preferences.
[ Insert Figure 6 here ]
We find in Panel A that CRRA utility generates the highest, and WDU the lowest level of consumption
risk aversion. Moreover, consumption risk aversion under HARA is almost flat compared to that obtained
under WDU, i.e. HARA generates no perceptible cyclical variation in attitudes towards consumption risk.
Clearly, in panel B, the wealth risk aversion index is zero for both CRRA and HARA. The level for WDU
is positive, generally lower, and less volatile compared to consumption risk aversion.
A reduced-form interpretation of the representative agent’s risk aversion can be obtained from the indirect
utility function Jt, and its corresponding relative risk aversion index −WtJww,t/Jw,t in (22). This variable
is plotted in panel C. Because the indirect utility is iso-morphic to the instantaneous utility, the CRRA
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function has a constant index equal to γ. For most of our sample, this level is lower than that obtained
under HARA and WDU. Note finally that the risk aversion under WDU is lower than that obtained under
HARA, with parallel, although more volatile, time paths.
We can explore the issue of cyclical movements of attitudes toward risk by comparing risk aversion series
with indices of the state of the economy. For that purpose, we use the University of Michigan Consumer
Confidence Index, a pro-cyclical subjective state measure, which we plot against the various measures of
risk aversion obtained under WDU. Panel A of Figure 7 plots the consumption risk aversion against the
confidence index. Clear counter-cyclical patterns emerge. Risk aversion is initially decreasing until the late
60’s, when the confidence index is stable. Then, risk aversion increases as the index falls in the early and
mid 70’s. The gradual recovery in consumer sentiment is associated with a smooth decline in consumption
risk aversion.
[ Insert Figure 7 here ]
The correspondence between attitudes toward risk and consumer confidence is even more striking for
wealth risk aversion in panel B. Pro-cyclical movements in wealth risk aversion mimic almost exactly those
in confidence, particularly up until the mid 70’s. After that period, the gradual increase in confidence is
associated with a smooth increase in wealth risk aversion.
We therefore find strong counter-cyclical movements in consumption risk aversion, and strong pro-cyclical
movements in wealth risk aversion. To verify which one of those two conflicting influences dominates,
we plot the indirect risk aversion (22) against the confidence index in panel C. Again, a counter-cyclical
movement clearly emerges. To understand this result, our estimates reveal that the bliss level of wealth
(21) is Wbliss = 4126.1, a positive value, whereas wealth in our sample ranges between 11 thousand and 48
thousand $. As wealth increases above bliss, movements in marginal utility are reduced and risk aversion
falls. This accords with our previous discussion of the value function in (18) that for positive bliss, a blase´
investor has lower and counter-cyclical risk aversion.
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4 Discussion: Implications for Asset Returns
Our empirical results obtained from the estimation of optimal consumption and portfolio rules using only
financial assets and financial wealth can be summarized as follows:
1. The intercept parameter η0 is non-zero and significant.
2. The wealth-dependence term ηw is positive and significant.
3. The curvature parameter γ is positive, realistic, and lower under WDU.
4. Risk aversion is counter-cyclical.
Because there is a relative paucity of empirical results in goods space for these models, it is difficult to
establish whether or not our findings make sense on a comparative basis. Nonetheless, we can use the
implied theoretical restrictions in price space to obtain further perspective on our goods-space results.
We consequently consider the implications of our model and of our results for asset returns. For that
purpose, we relax the assumption that the investment set is constant. Again, we can resort to the iso-
morphism result of Schroder and Skiadas (2002) to map the result from the dual problem to the primal
problem. A standard argument establishes that equilibrium state-price deflator in the dual market is given
by the marginal utility of consumption:
πˆt = e
−ρtUˆcˆ,t. (41)
Based on this we can:
1. compute the process for dπˆt/πˆt using dual utility (10) and dual consumption (9),
2. compute the dual short rate and risk premia processes rˆt,µpˆ,t − rˆt using (14) and (16),
3. map those dual expressions back into their primal counterparts rt,µp,t− rt by inverting (15) and (17).
These calculations reveal that the risk premia is:
µp,t − rt = R
rc
t Covt
(
dCt
Ct
,
dP t
P t
)
+Rrwt Covt
(
dWt
Wt
,
dP t
P t
)
. (42)
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The risk-free rate is given by:
rt = ρ− ηw/ηc +R
rc
t Et
(
dCt
Ct
)
+Rrwt Et
(
dWt
Wt
)
− 0.5
(
γ + 1
γ
)
×
[
(Rrct )
2Vart
(
dCt
Ct
)
+ 2Rrct R
rw
t Covt
(
dCt
Ct
,
dWt
Wt
)
+ (Rrwt )
2Vart
(
dWt
Wt
)]
(43)
where:
Rrxt ≡
−XtUxx,t
Ux,t
=
(
γηxXt
ηcCt + η0 + ηwWt
)
, Xt ∈ {Ct,Wt}
are the consumption and wealth relative risk aversion indices.
Risk premia The premia (42) is a two-factor pricing model, with the C-CAPM consumption beta supple-
mented by the CAPM total wealth return beta. In particular, (7) reveals that the quantity of consumption
risk, i.e. Covt (dCt/Ct, dP t/P t), is priced by the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion level, measured with respect to
consumption, i.e. Rrct . Similarly, the quantity of the market risk, i.e. Covt (dWt/Wt, dP t/P t), is priced by
the corresponding Arrow-Pratt risk aversion, measured with respect to wealth, i.e. Rrwt . The model can thus
be interpreted as a linear combination of a static CAPM (ηc = 0), and a standard C-CAPM (ηw = 0), where
the weights depend on the relative contributions of consumption and wealth to the agent’s utility.
Duffie and Epstein (1992) also obtain a two-factor model, although their model is derived under non-
expected utility, rather than VNM preferences. In addition, the relative weights depend on the distance
between risk aversion, and the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. Hence, an expected-
utility maximizer (risk aversion inversely equal to elasticity of inter-temporal substitution) does not price
market risk. In contrast, our agent maximizes expected utility but, for ηw 6= 0, nonetheless values market
risks. Moreover, the relative weights under WDU reflect the importance of consumption versus wealth risk
aversion. This is fortunate to the extent that it provides an intuitively appealing interpretation where each
risk is being priced by its corresponding risk aversion measure.
Our estimates indicate that optimal consumption is not proportional to wealth (finding 1). This has
important consequences for the pricing equations. To see this consider the case where η0 = 0 in (19).
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Then, the consumption/wealth ratio is constant, and the growth rates on consumption and wealth are equal:
dCt/Ct = dWt/Wt. Consequently, so are the covariance terms. Substitute in the premium (42) to obtain
that:
µp,t − rt|η0=0 =
(
γηcCt
ηcCt + ηwWt
+
γηwWt
ηcCt + ηwWt
)
Covt
(
dCt
Ct
,
dP t
P t
)
,
= γCovt
(
dCt
Ct
,
dP t
P t
)
,
which is simply the standard C-CAPM with CRRA preferences, in which wealth dependence plays no role.
Hence, our finding 1 that η0 6= 0 is important to allow for wealth dependence to impact asset returns. In this
perspective, our unequivocal rejection of the CRRA model can be interpreted as the dual in goods space of
its empirical anomalies in price space.
Second, the presence of a second source of IMRS risk is a welcomed addition in finding a solution for the
equity risk premium puzzle. Finding 2 establishes that ηw > 0 such that the price of the market risk, R
rw
t ,
is positive. This result is consistent with the multi-factor empirical literature which finds that market risk
is positively valued by the market (Chen et al., 1986; Ferson and Harvey, 1991). If the quantity of market
risk is also positive, then a high equity premia need not be explained by consumption risk alone. This is also
confirmed in our data set. Table 4 establishes that the total wealth risk of corporate stocks is much larger
(by a ratio of 91:1) than consumption risk. A consequence of estimating ηw > 0 is that this larger market risk
can justify the high observed premia at a lower level of risk aversion. This is consistent with our finding 3
that the curvature parameter γ, and the risk aversion estimates in general, are lower under WDU. These
results parallel those of Aı¨t-Sahalia et al. (2004) who derive the pricing kernels under direct preference for
luxury goods (measured essentially by durables, and thus a component of total wealth). Imposing positive
marginal utility of luxury goods (equivalent in our case to ηw > 0), they find that luxuries, who are mainly
owned by rich people, are more covariant with returns. Consequently, a larger quantity of risk, and a lower
risk aversion justify the observed premia.
[ Insert Table 4 here ]
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Third, note that the prices of both risks will in general be time-varying. Our results indicate that
relative risk aversion with respect to consumption (wealth) was counter- (pro-) cyclical, with the overall
indirect utility risk aversion being counter-cyclical (finding 4). This result would be consistent with the
predictability puzzle whereby the conditional premia are observed to fall during booms, and pick up during
recessions (Cochrane, 1997; Guvenen, 2003a). In the absence of strong conditional heteroscedasticity effects
in the quantities of consumption or market risks, predictability would be explained in our model by cyclical
movements in risk aversion. Similar counter-cyclical properties are obtained by Yogo (2003). Resorting to
direct preferences for durables, he explains the predictability of expected stock returns through cross effects
in marginal utility over durables and non-durables. During a recession, durables consumption typically
falls. For sufficiently high elasticity of substitution between durables and non-durables, the marginal utility
of non-durables increases. Consequently, the required premia for holding the risky asset also increases
during troughs. In our case, as discussed earlier, ηw > 0 yields a similar increase in the marginal utility of
consumption when wealth falls during recessions.
Risk-free rate As is well known, the risk-free rate puzzle is a by-product of the equity premium puzzle
(Weil, 1989; Kocherlakota, 1996). A high risk aversion implies a low elasticity of inter-temporal substitution,
and a high risk-free rate to induce savings. We have already mentioned that wealth dependence result in
lower curvature indices (finding 3), thereby potentially addressing the risk-free rate puzzle.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to study the impact of WDU for the predicted risk-free rate. As in the
standard case, the risk-free rate (43) captures a first-order and a second-order effect reflecting the mean and
the variance of the IMRS. In our model however, marginal utility depends on movements in both consumption
and in wealth.
Our empirical findings would be consistent with a low risk-free for a number of reasons. First, the effective
discount rate in (43) is now ρ − ηw/ηc; a positive ηw consistent with blase´ behavior (finding 2) reduces it
and consequently helps in reproducing the low observed rt. Second, a low rt is achieved if the second-order
effect on IMRS is stronger than the first-order one. More precisely, allowing for wealth dependence affects
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both the mean (through the conditional mean terms for consumption and wealth growth) and the variance
of the IMRS (through their conditional variance and covariance terms).
In particular, regardless of the sign of ηw, the variance of innovations in wealth enters negatively and
reduces the risk-free rate. Table 4 shows that the volatility of wealth growth is more than 60 times larger
than that of consumption growth (Lettau and Ludvigson, 2003, p. 2, also find that measured wealth growth is
much more volatile than consumption growth over short horizons). This effect should therefore be important
towards reducing the predicted rates. Moreover, the sample moments indicate that consumption growth is
positively correlated with wealth growth. Since ηw was estimated to be positive this covariance in (43)
tends to reduce further the predicted rate. Note however that ηw > 0 implies that the mean growth rate of
wealth affects positively the predicted risk-free rate. Since the empirical moments in Table 4 indicate that
mean consumption and wealth growth rates are roughly equal, this first-order effect could be important in
increasing the predicted rate.
Internal vs external WDU Our WDU model has been derived under an internal wealth-dependence
effect, whereby the agent’s own wealth affects his utility. In contrast, Campbell and Cochrane (1999a)
consider an external habit where bliss is determined by the other agents’ consumption levels. It seems
relevant therefore to ask how our results are modified if we substitute the aggregate wealth level, say W¯t,
instead of the personal wealth Wt in the preferences (3).
It can be shown that the premium (42) is unaffected when wealth preferences are external. Since aggregate
wealth is beyond the agent’s control in the latter case, external wealth is simply an exogenous state variable
that conditions preferences. Following Cox et al. (1985), if this variable is valued by the investor, it is
priced, if in addition it covaries with other assets, then it warrants a premium.13 However, under external
WDU, the risk-free rate (43) is modified compared to internal wealth preferences. In particular, the use of
Envelope theorem under internal wealth preferences implies that the effective discount rate is ρ − ηw/ηc;
under external wealth preferences, this rate is simply ρ. The agent internalizes the fact that he can (partially)
control future wealth, and therefore future bliss. Consequently, at the optimum, the agent’s subjective rate
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of time preference is affected. A ratchet investor (ηw < 0) is more impatient since higher future wealth
raises bliss and its associated marginal utility risk; a blase´ investor (ηw > 0) is more patient for the opposite
reasons.
To conclude, our wealth-dependent framework has the theoretical potential to successfully address the
three main pricing anomalies of the C-CAPM. Our empirical findings in goods space are consistent with
a WDU explanation of empirical asset returns puzzles. Whether or not similar estimation results in price
space are obtained will require further analysis which we leave on the research agenda.
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Notes
1Static problems define utility over terminal wealth, but implicitly assume that this wealth is entirely
consumed.
2Clearly the two observations are linked to one another under VNM preferences.
3The data is obtained from the Flow of Funds, is made available by the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Bank, and is discussed in further details below.
4Our cyclical patterns are robust to the choice of the wealth series in computing consumption and portfolio
shares. Replacing ‘Financial wealth’ by the more comprehensive ‘Net worth’ (i.e. including tangible assets,
mutual funds, pension plans, . . . net of liabilities) in the denominator in order to derive the consumption and
portfolio shares has no qualitative incidence on the patterns identified in Figure 1.
5The de-trended series are measured as deviations from a quadratic deterministic trend for log consump-
tion and log wealth respectively.
6See also Falato (2003), or Barberis et al. (2001) for wealth-dependent utility models allowing for rotations
in the marginal utility schedules.
7The theoretical restriction (5) stems from the financial problem we are analyzing. Consider the discrete-
time analog of maximizing (1) subject to (2). First-order and Envelope conditions yield the following:
Uc,t = exp(−ρ)Et{[Uc,t+1 + Uw,t+1]Ri,t+1},
or,
1 = exp(−ρ)(1 + ηw/ηc)Et
{(
ηcCt+1 + η0 + ηwWt+1
ηcCt + η0 + ηwWt
)−γ
Ri,t+1
}
.
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This Euler equation has a familiar representation, with the exception that the subjective discount factor is
now modified to allow for wealth dependence. It is reasonable to expect that the effective discount factor,
exp(−ρ)(1 + ηw/ηc) ∈ (0, 1). Restriction (5) follows immediately.
8The bliss level is fictitious in the sense of being a subjective, possibly negative, reference level.
9In comparison, typical habit models define the benchmark habit stock in terms of cumulated lagged
consumption (e.g. Constantinides, 1990, p. 522):
U = U(Ct,Xt), where Xt ≡
∫ t
0
exp[−a(t− s)]Csds+ exp(−at)X0.
10Following standard practices, the risk-free rate r is calibrated to its mean value.
11For example, pension reserves are typically invested differently by fund managers whether they are
defined benefit or defined contribution. Finding a unique pricing index for this series in the absence of
detailed information on the funds’ composition is impractical.
12In particular, (20) reveals that, for the risk-free asset:
V0,t = v00 + vw,0Wt (44)
where,
v00 = −v10 − v20, vw0 = 1− v1w − v2w. (45)
13Clearly, modifying the model so that the agent’s bliss now depend on the difference between own and
aggregate wealth, i.e. ηw(Wt−W¯t) would eliminate the market risk factor in the premia (42). In equilibrium,
a representative agent’s wealth is also the aggregate wealth: Wt = W¯t.
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Tables
Table 1: Sample moments: Shares of wealth
mean std correlation
Consumption 0.525 0.096 1.000 0.907 -0.233 -0.947
Deposits 0.473 0.123 1.000 -0.519 -0.970
Bonds 0.088 0.031 1.000 0.295
Stocks 0.440 0.110 1.000
Table 2: Sample moments: Real Returns
mean std correlation
Deposits 0.017 0.022 1.000 0.236 0.005
Bonds 0.036 0.130 1.000 0.212
Stocks 0.137 0.342 1.000
Table 3: Parameter Estimates
Param. Estim. T-stat. Estim. T-stat. Estim. T-stat.
A. CRRA B. HARA C. WDU
γ 6.187 4.822 5.799 2.747 5.341 2.937
η0 0 — -17.319 -49.462 -93.815 -3.943
ηw 0 — 0 — 0.019 3.215
µ1 0.007 3.329 0.007 2.395 0.008 4.061
µ2 0.026 7.602 0.028 6.129 0.023 3.846
Q(1, 1) 0.031 19.369 0.031 19.685 0.030 19.894
Q(1, 2) 0.017 2.573 0.017 3.008 0.016 2.935
Q(2, 2) 0.080 19.073 0.079 19.914 0.080 20.204
Note: Estimated model (39). Assets: [Deposits, Bonds, Stocks], Wealth: Wt = V0,t + V1,t + V2,t.
Sample period: 1952:II–2000:IV. Fixed parameters ρ = (1+0.035)1/4−1, and ηc = 1. µp are the
drift parameters, Qpp ≡ Chol(Σpp) is the Cholesky root of the covariance matrix of the returns
process.
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Table 4: Sample moments: Consumption, wealth growth and stock returns
mean std covariances
Consumption growth 0.02356 0.02079 0.00043 0.00051 0.00051
Wealth growth 0.03658 0.16291 0.02654 0.04701
Stock returns 0.13811 0.34218 0.11709
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Figure Legends
Figure 1 Shares of wealth: Cash, bonds and stocks.
Figure 2 De-trended log wealth and log consumption and untransformed consumption share.
Figure 3 Effects of increase in wealth on marginal utility, Ratchet Investors (ηw < 0).
Figure 4 Effects of increase in wealth on marginal utility, Blase´ Investors (ηw > 0).
Figure 5 Marginal utility of wealth at the optimum.
Figure 6 Arrow-Pratt Measures of Risk Aversion.
Figure 7 Risk Aversion and University of Michigan Consumer Confidence Index.
39
Figures
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
0.5
1
in
 s
ha
re
s 
of
 fi
na
nc
ia
l w
ea
lth
date
0
0.5
1
Cash
Bonds
Stock
XRI
Figure 1:
40
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
−1
0
1
date
0
0.5
1
Cons.(de−tr.)
Wealth (de−tr.)
Cons. share
XRI
Figure 2:
C
0 −(ηwW0)
−(ηwW1)
ηcC0 + η0
Uc = ηc(ηcC + η0 + ηwW )
−γ
a
b
Uc,1
Uc,0
Figure 3:
41
C
0−(ηwW1)
−(ηwW0)
ηcC0 + η0
Uc = ηc(ηcC + η0 + ηwW )
−γ
b
a
Uc,0
Uc,1
Figure 4:
W
0
Jw = F
1−γ(W −Wbliss)
−γ
Jw
Wbliss < 0 Wbliss > 0
ηw < 0
ηw > 0
ηw < 0
ηw > 0
Figure 5:
42
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
5
5.5
6
6.5
A. Consumption risk aversion
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
B. Wealth risk aversion
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
5
6
7
8
C. Indirect utility risk aversion
CRRA
HARA
WDU
CRRA
HARA
WDU
CRRA
HARA
WDU
Figure 6:
43
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
50
100
150
A. Consumption risk aversion
5
5.2
5.4
SENT
RR
c
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
B. Wealth risk aversion
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
SENT
RR
w
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
C. Indirect utility risk aversion
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
SENT
RRj
Figure 7:
44
